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Nothing indeed demonstrates more forcefully the extent to which Dutch water management corresponds
to the nature and the needs of the Dutch people and their land, and how it has emerged there from in a
natural fashion than the fact that the revolutionaries of 1795, despite being so intoxicated by their unex-
pected victory and sudden power that they overturned everything . . . nonetheless refrained from laying
hands on institutions whose extreme antiquity would in those days have provided more of an excuse to
abolish than to preserve them (J.W. Welcker, De Noorder-Lekdijk Bovendams en de doorsteking van den
Zuider-Lekdijk bij Culemborg 1803–1813. Een bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van den Nederlandschen
Waterstaat geschetst en met onuitgegeven stukken toegelicht (‘s-Gravenhage: 1880), p. 2).
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
On the 13th of January, 1811, the officers of the Dike Board of
the Northern Lek Dike beneath the Dam installed themselves in
their headquarters at Jaarsveld near the middle of their 25 km long
dike. Melting river ice and high water on the river had called them
there – following venerable custom and according to the Dike
Board’s precise regulations. Prior to their arrival, they had already
mustered their ‘‘dike-army,” composed of at least one able-bodied
male between the ages of 16 and 60 from every household of the
dike-district, including servants and field-hands. The men came
armed with hoes, shovels, horses and wagons to aid them in shor-
ing up soggy dikes, to heighten them with clay embankments
where the floodwaters threatened to overtop them and to stop
the leaks and seepages that could insidiously flush away a dike’s
core and leave it ripe for collapse. At 1:00 am on January 15th,
the officers noted a river stage of 56 3/4 in. below the so-called
emergency level (i.e. the top of the dike). By 1:00 pm the same
day the level had dropped to 59 3/4 in. below emergency level,
and by midnight to 69 1/4 in. The officers were ready to call it quits
and send the dike army home when they were apprised of a mis-
sive from the national intendant (requestmeester) for ‘‘bridges
and roads.” They were advised in no uncertain terms that once
the dike-army had been mustered it could not be sent home again
without express orders from the national Inspector of the Rivers.ll rights reserved.The following day, January 16th, the intendant himself came to in-
spect the dikes, and was received by the officers of the dike board.1
This minor incident, turning on a mistaken presumption by the
officers of the dike board that they still had discretionary authority
over disbanding their own dike army, illustrates both the persis-
tence of old attitudes and the new intransigence of the national
state during the 18 years of French domination of the Netherlands
between 1795 and 1813. This period in fact established the Neth-
erlands as a unified nation-state, and for the first time subjected
water management and flood control – which had always been a
local or at best a provincial concern – to central state authority.
It was not an easy transition. There was resistance by local and
regional water management authorities who were jealous of their
ancient privileges. To this was added a sincere conviction at all lev-
els that the robust local systems of drainage and flood control
could only be tampered with at the risk of inviting catastrophe.
At the same time, it was apparent to many that there was some-
thing seriously wrong with the rivers, and that it was getting
worse. Floods along the river had become ever more frequent in
the course of the 18th century, and the devastation they brought
was ever more complete and increasingly intolerable.
On the one hand, this was due to the deterioration of the river-
beds and floodplains which rendered the rivers increasingly unable
to drain off floodwaters and ice floes. This deterioration had two
main causes. First, the 18th century reconstruction of the split-
ting-point of the Rhine just below the German border had changed1 F.A.R.A. Baron van Ittersum, De Lekdijk Benedendams en de IJsseldam. Geschi-
edenis van dit Hoogheemraadschap van af de vroegste tijden, tot in de tweede helft
der negentiende eeuw (en voortgezet tot in de 20e eeuw), vol. 3, 1795–1905 (Utrecht:
J. van Druten, 1907), p. 93.
5 A ‘‘distributary” is a river branch that does not return to the main river.
Distributaries are very common features of river deltas.
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ous effects.2 Second, increasing population pressure had encouraged
the ‘‘domestication” of portions of the riverbed and the floodplains.
This took the form of reclamation of shallows and islands in the ac-
tual riverbed, the use of the floodplains for agricultural purposes
(including the building of low ‘‘summer dikes” and the planting of
trees), strangling the river in a plethora of groynes intended to abet
reclamation and to protect mainline levees, and finally the construc-
tion of brick factories and other buildings on the floodplains. All
these practices impeded flows of water and ice. During high waters
in the winter, ice floes could easily snag on the many obstacles in the
floodplains, leading to the formation of ice dams, extremely high
water and dike breaches.3
But in addition to the increased likelihood of flooding due to the
deteriorating hydraulic efficiency of the rivers, the amount of dam-
age wrought by a typical winter flood had also increased over time.
This was due in the first place simply to the increased population
and investments in land and property in the communities lining
the river. There was simply more to lose. But increased costs of
flooding were also the result of secular processes of oxidation
and soil subsidence due to increasingly effective drainage and
the incorporation of the lowest lying parcels into the agrarian pol-
der system.4 This reduction of the level of the lands behind the river
dikes was aggravated by a complementary rise in the level of espe-
cially the floodplains due to silt deposits from the river. The two pro-
cesses in tandem produced a secular increase in the difference
between polder levels and the levels of the rivers at flood stages.
For example, the difference in the level between the Lek in flood at
Schoonhoven and the lowest lying part of Holland near Rotterdam
amounted to nearly 20 meters by 1800.
In any case there were a few voices, chiefly in the newly victo-
rious Patriot camp, that ascribed the recurrent winter floods to the
lack of a strong central authority able to prevent the spoiling of the
flood plains by riparian farmers and landowners who put their pri-
vate interests before the common good. In this article, I want to
examine how these Patriot reformers and their new centralist state
acted on this belief, and how the new state engineers managed to
insinuate themselves into the venerable local practices of flood
control on the rivers and thereby to lay a foundation for the mul-
ti-tiered structure of water governance that enabled, and still en-
ables, the Dutch to prevail against the rivers and the sea – at
least most of the time.
Between 1581 and 1795, the Netherlands was more like a loose
federation of provinces than a nation-state. Its name, the ‘‘Republic
of the Seventeen United Netherlands,” suggests as much. Power
was wielded chiefly by the seven Provincial Estates which deferred
to the Estates General in The Hague only in matters of war and
diplomacy. In 1795, this loose-jointed state was overthrown by
Dutch ‘‘Patriot” revolutionaries. They were backed up by French
Revolutionary troops who had taken advantage of frozen rivers2 Anneke Driessen, Watersnood tussen Maas en Waal: overstromingsrampen in het
rivierengebied tussen 1780 en 1810 (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1994), p. 31.
3 Toon Bosch, Om de macht over het water. De nationale waterstaatsdienst tussen
staat en samenleving 1798–1849 (Zaltbommel: Europese bibliotheek, 2000), pp. 22–23.
Bosch’s book provides an essential framework for anyone studying the first half-
century of nationalized water management in the Netherlands, and I am greatly
indebted to it for providing an overview and for clues on where to look in analyzing
the Rijkswaterstaat’s integration into local arrangements for water management. See
also Alex van Heezik, Strijd om de rivieren. 200 jaar rivierenbeleid in Nederland (Den
Haag/Haarlem: Rijkswaterstaat, 2006), Driessen.
4 Gerard van de Ven, ed., Man-made lowlands: history of water management and
land reclamation in the Netherlands (Utrecht: Matrijs, 1993), G.J. Borger and J.
Bruines, Binnenwaeters gewelt. 450 jaar boezembeheer in Hollands Noorderkwartier
(Edam: Hoogheemraadschap van uitwaterende sluizen in Hollands Noorderkwartier;
stichting uitgeverij Noord-Holland, 1994), Petra J.E.M. van Dam, ‘‘Ecological Chal-
lenges, Technological Innovations. The Modernization of Sluice Building in Holland
1300–1600,” Technology and Culture 43, no. 3 (2002).to march unhindered into the heart of the Netherlands. The new
‘‘Batavian” state was heir to the centralism that pervaded both
France’s absolutist and revolutionary traditions. In the course of
the next half-century, the institutions of this centralized state –
persisting past the French occupation itself – increasingly chal-
lenged the old provincial and local hegemony over the rivers.
Under the Republic, water management was locally organized:
drainage and flood control was managed by several thousand
water boards. These had a tradition of fierce independence, having
become accountable to their respective Provincial Estates only
since the 1730s. In the course of the 18th century, a number of
enlightened spirits began to argue that this fragmented water
management made it impossible to deal with a number of pressing
problems. Chief among these was the chronic flooding of the lands
along the large rivers that coursed through the country: the Rhine
and its distributaries, the Meuse and the Scheldt.5 A special con-
cern, especially for the inhabitants of the wealthy maritime province
of Holland, was the questionable state of the river dikes (levees)
along the north shore of the Lek River. Breaches in these dikes would
not only affect the immediate riparian populations but also those at
a great distance from the river. The very heart of the country would
be flooded, and unimaginable suffering and economic devastation
would ensue. The diagnosis made by the leading lights of the day
was clear enough: the dikes – especially those along the northern
shore of the Lek – had to be improved, and the rivers and their bed-
dings had to be re-engineered to enable them to carry off the up-
stream floodwaters and ice floes before they could form ice dams.6
The problem, however, was how to coordinate this as a national pro-
ject given the vested interests of local and provincial elites who –
rather understandably – were interested above all in their own
safety and political autonomy.
The quandary faced by the new centralized state, first under pa-
triot and French rule and after 1814 under the House of Orange,
was how to frame a national level of water policy and water con-
trol systems without compromising the quality and proven effec-
tiveness of the dense fabric of local and provincial water
management. On the one hand, it was impossible to simply replace
these fine-grained local systems of drainage and flood control by
uniform national systems. On the other hand, it would not do to
let vested local and provincial interests continue to paralyze na-
tional projects for improvement of the rivers. The nationalization
of river management seemed to many the only possibility for
reducing the chances of disastrous flooding across the board, and
especially for countering the threat that hung over the provinces
of Utrecht and Holland.7
Most descriptions of the evolution of Dutch water management
and flood control between 1795 and the 1850s tend to emphasize6 This diagnosis had been made and publicized as early as 1740 bij the surveyor of
the wealthy and influential water board of Rijnland, Melchior Bolstra. Rijnland was
the driving force behind the development of the Waterstaat Service of the Province of
Holland which was the precursor of the national Waterstaat. Rijnland supplied the
personnel, the expertise, the maps and the political clout for the first Provincial
Waterstaat which itself prepared the ground for the concerted attack on the rivers –
and in particular the calamitous Northern Lek Dike. Paul van den Brink, ‘‘Rijnland en
de Rivieren. Inrichting en vormgeving van de Hollandse rivierzorg in de achttiende
eeuw,” Tijdschrift voor Waterstaatsgeschiedenis 12 (2003). See also Paul van den Brink,
In een opslag van het oog. De Hollandse rivierkartografie en waterstaatszorg in opkomst,
1725–1754 (Alphen a/d Rijn: Canaletto/Repro Holland, 1998). for the important role of
map making in framing river policy in the 18th and 19th centuries. For the history of
map-making by the Rijkswaterstaat see Hubert Charles Toussaint, Uitgemeten en
uitgetekend: de geschiedenis van de Algemene Dienst van de Rijkswaterstaat (The Hague:
Rijkswaterstaat, 1998).
7 Although floods in fact occurred most frequently in agricultural regions of the
provinces of Gelderland and in Brabant, a major flood in the low-lying and heavily
urbanized provinces of Utrecht or Holland could be expected to be much more
extensive and immeasurably more destructive.
Fig. 1. Spaces and times on rivers.
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were floated but not implemented during this period.8 Indeed, it
took until 1850 before a coherent, authoritative and realistic plan
could be put forth (by the state engineers J.H. Ferrand and L.J.A.
van der Kun). Prior to that time, the Rijkswaterstaat (the new na-
tional public works agency founded in 1798) lacked a convincing
and coherent engineering strategy, let alone the political backing,
to actually initiate any kind of ambitious centrally coordinated river
engineering projects. However, I want to argue here that despite the
lack of consensus on river-engineering and the paucity of actual
improvements to the condition of the river beds or to the morphol-
ogy of the river system between 1795 and 1850, the national govern-
ment – embodied in the nascent Rijkswaterstaat – did succeed in
establishing an institutionalized beachhead on the rivers. It accom-
plished this on the basis of its cosmopolitan expertise, its national
organizational scale, and especially its position as mediator among
conflicting local and regional interests.
However, this beachhead was not and could not be based on the
simple displacement of local powers. Instead, it depended on the
exploitation of various niches in the existing structure of riverine
governance. The Rijkswaterstaat succeeded in establishing a mea-
sure of control both over specific places in the river and over spe-
cific times or occurrences. This could only be sustained in the
long run, especially after the resurgence of provincial powers after
the end of French domination in 1813, if local and regional parties
became convinced that such interventions actually improved the
ability to manage or prevent floods. The resulting nested structures
of river management and flood control were instrumental in pre-
paring the ground for the radical river improvements of the second
half of the 19th century.
2. Spaces and times on the river
During the ‘‘Batavian–French period” lasting from 1795 to
1814, the Rijkswaterstaat made inroads on the Dutch rivers by
striving for mastery over specific places and times. This gave
the agency a measure of national control, without seriously com-
promising the crucial role of existing local drainage and flood
control arrangements. The resulting distribution of rights and
responsibilities can be mapped onto the complex cross-sectional
morphology of diked-in rivers. Fig. 1 shows a typical diked-in riv-
er in the Dutch lowlands. Four different zones can be discerned:
(1) the river in the so-called summer bed, (2) the floodplains,
which at high river stages, are part of the ‘‘winter bed,” (3) the8 Ven, ed, Anton Bosch, ‘‘Naar eenheid en eenvoud. De oprichting en ontwikkeling
van de Rijkswaterstaat 1798–1850.” Tijdschrift voor Waterstaatsgeschiedenis 7, no. 2
(1998), Toon Bosch and Willem van der Ham, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat. 1798–
1998. (Zaltbommel: Europese Bibliotheek, 1998).dikes, and (4) the lands behind the dikes. Moreover, the figure
shows two different ‘‘times,” first, the river under normal condi-
tions and second, the river at high stages. In the Netherlands,
the first situation is typical of the summer half-year and the sec-
ond of the winter half-year, hence the concepts of ‘‘summer” and
‘‘winter” bed. The river’s morphology is different between the
first and the second ‘‘times.” At high stages, the floodplains and
summer dikes become part of the riverbed. Also, at high stages
the dikes are waterlogged, under pressure from river water, and
susceptible to breaching. Both the different zones and the differ-
ent times present different kinds of opportunities for the imposi-
tion of national authority and hence map different combinations
of local and national governance.
The lands behind the dikes were and are a mixture of private
and public property: farms and homes, but also roads, public build-
ings and other infrastructure. The land and objects were under the
purview of towns, villages councils and provinces, and after 1795
of the nation state as well. Holders of private property in the vicin-
ity of the dikes were compulsory members of the local dike board,
being burdened with the physical maintenance of a particular sec-
tion of dike or its equivalent in taxes – under pain of fines and
imprisonment. It should be noted that their exertions and sacri-
fices often benefited property holders at very great distances from
the river. The flat lands through which the middle and lower
reaches of these rivers coursed offered little resistance to the prop-
agation of floods, and some dikes protected lands at a distance of
nearly 100 km from the rivers themselves. As noted, the most sen-
sitive site was the Northern Lek Dike, divided between two distinct
dike boards, which protected much of the provinces of Holland and
Utrecht. The situation here was extra dangerous, not only because
of the questionable state of the dike’s foundations, but also because
the lands at some distance from the dike were actually much lower
than those immediately behind the dike. In fact, when the river
was in flood, its waters were almost 20 meters higher than the
lowest portions of the countryside. In the event of a dike rupture
here, the floodwaters would rush into these depressions with ter-
rifying speed, taking everything with them that stood in the way.
The second zone, the actual dikes, which were designed to con-
fine the river’s flow between sharply defined boundaries even at
the highest river stages, was built, owned andmanaged in common
by the property owners whose lands were immediately or nearly
contiguous. Organized within the legal framework of the dike
board, these landholders contributed to the maintenance of the
dikes either in natura or, increasingly in the course of the 19th cen-
tury, in the form of specific dike taxes. The dikes were neither pub-
lic property in the sense that they were managed by municipal,
provincial or national governments, nor were they strictly speaking
private property, in the sense that individual owners could use and
abuse them as they saw fit. Rather, as Arne Kaijser argued, they
122 C. Disco / Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 34 (2009) 119–131were a kind of commons.9 From this perspective, the water or dike
boards were institutions that organized the ‘‘commoners” for the
purpose of maintaining their collectively owned dikes. This said,
dikes were not a classic commons in the sense of a resource which
was actually used by villagers as members of a water board, and
which could be degraded by such use to eventually produce ‘‘tragic”
outcomes.10 Dikes were ‘‘used” to turn high water, to be sure, but
this was not used by the inhabitants themselves; wear and tear on
the dikes depended on the vagaries of the river and the climate, as
well as on the quality of dike maintenance. What was held in com-
mon, actually, was the collective burden of keeping the dikes in good
condition, i.e. routine maintenance, preventing abuse, and ensuring
that such damage as was done to dikes by high water and other
causes was repaired as soon as possible. The major socio-political
problem, then, was not to regulate the actual use of the dikes as in
the case of ‘‘common pool resources,” but to ensure equity in the
burden of upkeep.11 This was accomplished by apportioning a por-
tion of the water board’s total dike-length to the various landholders
in proportion to the size of their landholdings. And because some
sections of dike were more susceptible to damage or harder to main-
tain than others, each landholder was apportioned sections in both
‘‘easy” and ‘‘hard” reaches of the dike.12 It goes without saying that
ensuring and maintaining justice, especially in the eyes of the ‘‘dike-
burdened” themselves, demanded fine negotiating skills and peri-
odic adjustments and revisions in the allotment of dike parcels.
Many local dike-regulations called for such periodic readjustments
at intervals varying from a mere 6 years in some river districts to
33 years in West Friesland.13
Between the actual river and the dike existed floodplains of vary-
ing width, which with a little help from low ‘‘summer-dikes” fring-9 Arne Kaijser, ‘‘System Building from Below. Institutional Change in Dutch Water
Control Systems,” Technology and Culture 43, no. 3 (2002).
10 The seminal essay on such classic commons including the reasons why they
inevitably had ‘‘tragic” outcomes is Garrett Hardin, ‘‘The Tragedy of the Commons.,”
Science 162 (1968). Hardin’s somber view of commons has since been refuted by,
among others, Eline Ostrom. See Elinor Ostrom, ‘‘Collective Action and the Tragedy of
the Commons,” in Managing the Commons, ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden (San
Francisco: 1977), Elinor Ostrom et al., eds., The Drama of the Commons (Washington
DC: National Academy Press, 2002). However, there were also the uses of the dikes by
the commoners which involved them in the logic of Hardin’s tragedy of ‘‘common
pool resources,” (as Ostrom later characterized them). For example, allowing their
pigs and geese to graze on the dikes, driving horses and carriages on their outer flanks,
or allowing trees to grow in them could all affect the integrity of the dikes and
degrade their usefulness as flood-defenses. Such practices were in fact frequently
forbidden on pain of fines or even imprisonment by the regulations of many dike
boards.
11 ‘‘Common pool resources” are defined by Elinor Ostrom as commonly owned
resources, i.e. resources freely accessible to members of some community and thus
devoid of individual property rights, which are also degraded or consumed by use.
These are the kinds of commons which Garret Hardin described as being susceptible
to ‘‘tragedy.”
12 A.A. Beekman, Het dijk- en waterschapsrecht in Nederland vóór 1795, 2 vols. (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1905), 494, pp. 1538–1539.
13 A.A. Beekman, Het dijk- en waterschapsrecht in Nederland vóór 1795, 2 vols. (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1905), 494, pp. 1539–1542. This periodic revision of the
dike-registers (dijkcedullen) was necessary in view of the constantly changing
conditions of the dikes and the changing property qualifications of the villagers. The
pursuit of equity in this division of dike maintenance (verhoefslaging), which often
involved burdening a given property with an ‘‘easy” and a ‘‘difficult” stretch of dike,
further increased the already extreme fragmentation of dike sections. Some indication
is provided by the dike-registers of the village of Hellouw on the Waal. This village
was responsible for some 3.5 km of mainline dikes along the Waal. Up to 1779
maintenance duties were reapportioned among the village property owners every 6
years; thereafter every 10–14 years. The 3.5 km of dikes was divided up into some
312 parcels, giving an average length of about 11 m. Parcels were measured in
Gelderland Rods (=3.8 m or 16 Gelderland feet). Only three parcels exceeded 20 rods,
the biggest being 30 rods. Most parcels were one or two rods long. The smallest parcel
was only 1 foot, 7 and 2/3(!) in. long. Besides the frequent revision and fragmentation
of dike duties, the extreme precision (at least on paper) testifies to the high value
placed on an equitable distribution of dike duties. Dijkcedullen van Hellouw 1773–
1833, Polderdistrict Tielerwaard v.Idd 283 Rijks Archief Arnhem. www.hogenda.nl/
Docs/Attachment.aspx?ID=%7Bf9f5f104-2a03-457e-adae-2d6a1aba57fb%7D.ing the river’s summer bed, could be expected to remain dry
throughout the summer growing season. These floodplains, like
the landsbehind thedikes, also consistedofprivateholdings. Theex-
tremely fertile lands were generally used for growing crops, but
brick factories, farm buildings and even castles (e.g. Doorwerth Cas-
tledating from1280)hadbeenandcontinued tobebuilt on thehigh-
er portions. The floodplains were politically an extension of the
riparian lands behind the dikes but inasmuch as they were subject
to flooding in the winter could only be depended on for part of the
year, generally fromMay toOctober. At higher river stages the flood-
plains actually became part of the riverbed, and their condition
partly determined the river’s capacity to discharge water and ice.
Though seasonal crop-growing had little impact because there was
atmost only short stubble left on the fields after the harvest, the cul-
tivation of trees and the construction of high summer dikes and
buildings structurally impeded the river’s ability to discharge water
at high stages. Hence, floods made manifest the latent conflict of
interest between the local users of the floodplains and the upstream
riparianpopulations. Themore intensive theuseof thefloodplains at
any point along the river, the less effective the river became in dis-
charging water and ice at that point, and the higher the river stages
upstream of that point would become. The tenacity of the problem
lay in the disjunction between those who profited from what far-
sighted commentators called the ‘‘spoiling” of the riverbeds and
those others who might suffer when high water and ice choked
the constricted river. There was, in other words, no short-term
incentive not to ‘‘spoil” the local floodplains and every consideration
of self-interest to do so. Also, exploiting the floodplains delivered
constant benefits while it exacted only occasional costs.
The ‘‘minimal” river, the actual shipping channel indicated in
Fig. 1 as the ‘‘summer bed,” was that portion of the riverbed that
was permanently inundated by the river’s flow – even at the lowest
river stages. It obviously had no agricultural relevance for the local
riparians, though it could supply them with fish and, more impor-
tantly, with reclaimed land which could be added to private flood-
plain property and planted with crops or trees. Though under
certain conditions riparian populations had rights to both, they
could have no property in the river itself. Needless to say, both per-
manent fishing nets and the reclamation of land from the summer
channel were hardly a boon to navigation or to the river’s capacity
to discharge water. Again, here was a latent conflict of interest be-
tween riparian landownerswith an interest in ‘‘privatizing” portions
of thepublic domain contiguous to their properties andmoredistant
(and national) parties who wanted to optimize that public domain
for the purposes of navigability and flood control. This tension had
already been manifest in provincial ordinances regulating private
encroachmentson the riverduring theRepublic. Thesewere codified
in Gelderland by 1715, and specified that only reclamations directly
adjoining the shore could be privatized. Groynes could not extend
more than one-third of theway across the river. However, these reg-
ulations were hardly enforced in actual practice, and the riverbeds
continued to be further constricted.14 During the ‘‘French period”,
the nation-state assumed the burden of superintendence of local river
usage, ultimately codified in the ‘‘River Law” of 1806 (see Fig. 3).
But this placid, if heterogeneous, topology could be overturned
by times of high water. At such times, new threats and interests
emerged which provided a different basis for grafting local to na-
tional interests. What was river (and river bed) and what was not,
depended on the river’s stage at any given moment. The summer
bed defined the river only at its very lowest stages. When heavy
rains, ice dams, and constrictions and obstacles in the riverbed
caused thewaters to rise, the river covered the floodplains and crept
up against the winter dikes. The privatized floodplains now became14 Driessen, 61–62.
19 Bosch, Om de macht over het water. De nationale waterstaatsdienst tussen staat
en samenleving 1798–1849, pp. 109–112.
20 The condition of the dikes was in any case a matter of concern to the Patriot
government from its inception. A circular letter from the Committee for the General
C. Disco / Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 34 (2009) 119–131 123part of the river bedding, and could be redefined as possibly trouble-
some hydraulic surfaces. The swollen river now became a common
threat to all the riparian farms, villages and towns along its length. It
was clearly in the general interest of these inhabitants and their gov-
ernments that the dikes should everywhere be as strong as possible,
and that the river bed itself should be as efficient as possible in dis-
charging the flow. Similar considerations applied to the breaking up
of ice jams, at least for river stretches upstream of the dams. In a
sense, then, the river in flood was a kind of inverse commons: not
a shared resource, but rather a shared threat which made it advan-
tageous for the various stakeholders to act in concert to improve
their collective chances of escaping tragedy.
However, there was also a perverse element involved in this
game inasmuch as a dike breach at any location tended to lower
water levels in the river, and was perceived to reduce chances
for dike breaches at other locations, both upstream and down-
stream. The widespread concern for the integrity of the Northern
Lek Dike, for example, made artificial floodways that drew water
away from the dike into the so-called diversions, a seductive op-
tion for some. A major question facing the protagonists of a na-
tional presence on the rivers was to what extent national policy
could facilitate the creation of artificial diversions which would
sacrifice smaller or more sparsely settled lands to save larger and
more urbanized lands from flooding.
3. The nation-state on the rivers
3.1. The Unitarist State, 1795–1801
The Unitarist Constitution of 1798, which established the Bata-
vian Republic, made only the most fleeting reference to water man-
agement, avowing that the new state would exercise a mandate for
toezicht, i.e. superintendence, of the ‘‘dikes, roads and waters”.15
Despite the brevity of the allusion, it was clear that in this sphere
federalism, i.e. a state founded on an alliance among largely auton-
omous provinces, had had its day. The new policy in the area of
water management was detailed in Instructions for the ‘‘Agent for
Internal Affairs and Supervision of the Dikes, Roads and Waters of
the Batavian Republic” passed by the Representative Assembly in
October 1799.16 The agent’s Instructions stipulated that he was
thenceforth charged with ‘‘superintendence of private works and
those not turning rivers and seas, in addition to those turning rivers
and seas.” However, the maintenance of all works remained the
responsibility of the ‘‘owners or the dike and polder boards.”17 To
carry out this ambiguous program, a ‘‘chief commissar-inspector”
was appointed, along with a staff of fourteen ‘‘commissars-inspec-
tors.”18 The latter functionaries were stationed in the various
‘‘departments” into which the Batavian Republic was divided, and
were responsible for inspecting the water boards and for seeing to
the execution of national public works policies.
Though the precise organizational and political arrangements
would change frequently in the years to follow, the Instructions
of 1799 established a national organization in the domain of water15 Grondwet van 1798, Titul IV, Van het Uitvoerend Bewind, Lid XCII.
16 This agent (i.e. minister) was one of eight appointed by the ‘‘Executive Body” (the
Dutch version of the French Directoire) to implement its new policies. Drafting
watertight instructions seems to have been no sinecure. A committee was appointed
in August 1798, but it took more than a year and a number of revisions before the text
was approved by parliament on October 31, 1799. Joan Roëll, Historisch-staatsregtelijk
onderzoek naar het algemeen en het bijzonder bestuur van den Waterstaat in Nederland
van 1795–1848 (Utrecht: J. de Kruyff, 1866), pp. 45–53.
17 Welcker, p. 5. ‘‘Private” here refers to non-state ownership, i.e. also the property
held in common by private landowners, like most of the dikes along the rivers.
18 Christiaan Brunings, eminent surveyor and former chief engineer of the large and
prosperous Rijnland Water Board, was appointed as the first chief commisar-
inspector.management and public works which turned out to be surprisingly
robust.19 This organization not only survived the new constitution of
1801, which restored provincial/departmental superintendence over
the water boards, but even the fall of Napoleon and the establish-
ment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1814. Throughout all
these changes its personnel also remained remarkably stable, with
experienced surveyors and waterworks engineers like Christiaan
Brunings, Jan Blanken, Adrianus F. Goudriaan and Frederik W. Con-
rad setting the tone for many years.
How did the new organization, a creature of the centralizing
ideology of the revolutionary Batavian Republic, acquit itself of
its novel responsibilities? How was national ‘‘superintendence”
over ‘‘private” works realized in practice? In particular, what
spaces and what times were seized upon to establish a national
presence on the rivers?
There was little the nation-state could do in the private-public
space behind the dikes. This was the domain of village councils,
private landholdings and dike-boards. The dikes themselves, as
‘‘works to turn the water,” were subject by virtue of the Instructions
to ‘‘superintendence” by the commissars-inspectors. Twice-yearly
inspections were mandated, and water boards could be called to
account if their dikes were substandard or poorly maintained.
However, from the perspective of the local dike boards this was
not really a novel form of discipline, but simply a continuation of
the superintendance formerly exercised by the provincial estates.
It may well have made a difference, of course, that inspections
were now carried out by a more distant national, rather than a
(likely more ‘‘incestuous”) provincial, authority.20 The third space,
the floodplains, was somewhat more amenable to national control
than the lands behind the dikes inasmuch as it could be said to con-
tain works and structures which affected the hydraulic performance
of the river. Still, it was a space of private landholdings and occa-
sional common pastures which had not suffered much in the way
of provincial regulation under the Republic. The Instructions did
seem to provide a new legal basis for national interference in this do-
main, though nothing was as yet specifically spelled out. Finally,
there was the navigational channel. The big rivers were all navigable,
and this was a clear mandate for the nation-state – as it had been for
the provinces. Navigation clearly predicated the subjection of local
interests (in matters such as fishing, ferries, bridges, land reclama-
tion and harbors) to regional, national and even international inter-
ests in the maintenance of a continuous and unimpeded waterway.
That this also extended to the engineering of the river bed for pur-
poses of flood control seemed a logical but by no means necessary
extension of this principle. There were legal precedents in the sense
that the former provinces had claimed jurisdiction over the river
beds – as well as over a continuous towpath along the banks.21 In
a sense, then, the actual water in the river, as well as the summerWelfare of the Provisional Representatives of the People of Holland to all the dike
boards dated August 5, 1795 ‘‘’earnestly warned them (the dike boards, CD) and if
necessary commanded them’ before the coming winter to repair all damage incurred
to dikes and sluices over the past season, in order to prevent disasters.” cited in
Ittersum, p. 31.
21 Van Ittersum cites an ordinance dated 1553 in which priority in the use of the
river banks is granted to transient users rather than to riparian residents. It is stated
that ‘‘inasmuch as the use of all banks and shores of streams are common and public,
in order that they may be used by anyone to facilitate shipping on the river.” Edicts of
Maximillian of Burgundy ‘‘Regarding the conservation of the towpath along the River
Lek.” Cited in Ittersum, p. 51. The point was that the emperor, and later the Provincial
Estates, regarded it as their responsibility to ensure that the towpath remained free
and accessible, which of course encroached on the free use of the river banks by
private owners of riparian property. See also Jan Godfried Adriaan van Zijst, De
Nederlandse Strafwetgeving ter Bescherming van Dijken en Rivieren (Utrecht: J. Greven,
1867).
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and princes, provincial estates and now by the Agent in the name of
the Batavian Republic and its people.
Hence, while there were clearly spaces on the river which the
new Rijkswaterstaat could exploit in pursuit of more effective flood
control, there were just as obviously spaces from which it was all
but excluded. However, this static topology of influence could be
dramatically transformed by episodes of high water on the rivers.
Times of high river stages or times when the river was threatened
by ice dams afforded special opportunities for nationalizing super-
intendence. Although the ‘‘French period” was a turbulent episode
in Dutch history, nature was hardly impressed, and as always the
advent of every winter brought the renewed threat of high river
stages, ice dams, dike breaches and flooding. Though all the dike
boards had venerable protocols for dealing with extraordinarily
high river stages or the breakup of ice on the river, as can be gleaned
from the story at the outset of this paper, the Agent and his corps of
‘‘commissar-inspectors” felt a growing sense of their own national
responsibility at the outset of each newand threateningwinter. This
impulse toward a new nationalized order on the Dutch rivers drew
inspiration not only from the Batavian constitution, but also from
the near-failure of the northern Lek dikes in 1795.22 It became a con-
certed effort after a series of dike breaches once again caused exten-
sive flooding along all the major rivers in the winter of 1799–1800.
The first sally by the new state into governance of the rivers flo-
wed forth quite directly from the prerogatives of superintendence
over dikes and other works as set out in the Instructions of 1799. On
January 9th, 1800, the Agent for the Department of Supervision
over the Condition of the Dikes, Roads and Waters submitted a re-
quest to the Executive Council that in view of the ‘‘terrible events”
of the previous year and ‘‘fearsome disasters” possibly to come,
first, experts be sent, as in the previous year, to inspect the emer-
gency stores prepared by the dike boards for the coming winter
and ‘‘in case of emergencies to keep an eye on the work of the dike
boards”, and second, Lieutenant-Colonel-Inspector C.R.T. Krayen-
hoff be dispatched to the town of Gorinchem ‘‘in times of need”
to keep the government ‘‘informed of the condition of the threa-
tened lands.”23 Note that the state is here no longer merely ‘‘super-
vising” the local care of dikes and sluices on a routine basis, but
seizing on special times of heightened danger to establish a panop-
tical and decidedly supra-local presence on the rivers.
Nonetheless, these ambitions were certainly in keeping with
the Instructions for the Agent. Article 43 of the Instructions enjoined
the Agent, in response to dike breaches and flooding, to do every-
thing that he deemed necessary, even in the face of resistance. If
necessary he could count on the armed might of the Executive
Body. He was to adopt any and all measures that might contribute
to closing the breaches and to rapidly draining off the floodwaters
so as to minimize damage to nearby places and minimize costs to
the inhabitants.24 From a legal point of view, the question was no
longer whether the national government could claim a commanding22 The dikes along the northern shore of the Lek survived, at least in the imagination
of a number of prominent water engineers and the general public, thanks only to a
spontaneous breach in the dikes along the opposite, southern shore at the Spoel, just
upstream of Culemborg. This ‘‘natural” event was seized upon as a precursor for
artificial measures (never implemented) to preserve the Northern Lek Dike in both
1803 and 1809. See Welcker.
23 Quoted in Jan Zacharias Mazel, De verdediging der Rivierdijken bij IJsgang en hoog
Opperwater (Leiden: P. Somerwil, 1886), 19. Krayenhoff was a highly capable and
well-respected physician, philosopher, military engineer and patriot who is best
known for his precise triangulation and elevation mapping of the territory of the
Batavian Republic, Belgium and Luxemburg carried out between 1802 and 1811.
Aside from their military relevance, the resulting maps and their underlying
measurements were crucial to establishing a uniform national system of measure-
ments and correspondence on the rivers.
24 Quoted in Jan Zacharias Mazel, De verdediging der Rivierdijken bij IJsgang en hoog
Opperwater (Leiden: P. Somerwil, 1886), p. 26.role on the rivers during times of flood and crisis, but rather how far
it could go in claiming spaces and times at the expense of local and
provincial interests. Would the central state be satisfied with the
right of inspection and supervision over local dike boards in times
of crisis and with the panoptical accumulation of information on
the state of the river in times of flood? Or was this merely an enter-
ing wedge for a much more decisive presence in the various spaces
on the river in times of flood – and eventually in normal times as
well?
The surveyors and engineers heading the new Rijkswaterstaat
seem in any case to have had little faith in the competence of the
officers of most of the local water boards or in their fortitude in
times of danger. One letter complained that ‘‘often enough the lit-
tle knowledge found among some of the officers of the dike boards
has required assistance from the state, when it concerned only dai-
ly troubles and quite normal losses of land.”25 And as the formida-
ble Christiaan Brunings wryly noted: ‘‘that the aforementioned dike-
board needs no advice in times of danger, one must believe on the
basis of the testimony of the Departmental (i.e. provincial, cd) Gov-
ernment, on account of the competence of its members; and indeed
this dike board seems to have undergone a favorable change because
previously such competence concentrated itself chiefly in the person
of the dike master.”26 Such sentiments motivated the newly ap-
pointed inspectors-commissars for the river departments to work
out a plan for wintertime river surveillance during a meeting held
at Vianen on December 12 and 13, 1800. It was agreed that when
high water or potential ice jams threatened the river-dikes, the
inspectors-commissars would occupy command posts on the rivers
and distribute their subordinate personnel at interstitial positions
along the dikes.27 Correspondence among the posts about the condi-
tion of the river and the dikes would be maintained by ‘‘hussars or
dragoons.” Officers and troops garrisoned at towns along the river
could be commandeered to lend ‘‘necessary assistance” in case of
need. A system of signals using coded cannonades and flags was
adopted to communicate about specific events or impending dangers
– and also as warnings to the inhabitants. It should be noted that this
was not a covenant with the water boards but rather more like a
plan for ‘‘occupation” of the dikes by the central state during times
of ice and high water. Such a covenant was in fact considered at
the meeting, but it was deemed too late in the season to undertake
the necessary negotiations with the numerous dike boards involved.
Arrangements were made to ‘‘correspond” with water boards and
municipalities on the German Middle Rhine in order to be apprised
of conditions upstream (washes, the immanent breakup of river ice,
and weather conditions) at the earliest possible moment.
3.2. A delicate balance: 1801–1806
In October 1801, a new constitution curtailed the powers of the
central Representative Assembly and restored to the Departments
(roughly equivalent to the erstwhile provinces) many of the pow-
ers they had enjoyed prior to 1798. The Agents were replaced by
‘‘councils” charged with carrying out the policies of the Executive25 Letter Council of Internal Affairs to the State Executive (Staatsbewind) 19 January,
1803, no. 42/10. Cited in Welcker, p. 19.
26 Report C. Brunings to Council of Internal Affairs, 23 February, 1803. Cited in
Welcker. Welcker noted that the dike-board referred to was the Northern Lek-Dike
above the Dam, one of the two dike boards responsible for the vulnerable Northern
Lek Dike. The dike master was an employee of the dike board – often one of the local
farmers – charged with day-to-day management of the dikes. Bruning argued that –
at least in former times – the only competent person in the water board was the
subordinate dike master.
27 This personnel consisted of permanent employees of the Rijkswaterstaat, but also
of temporary functionaries recruited from among the local dike masters. So despite
the fact that there was no formal arrangement between the Rijkswaterstaat and the
local boards, the Rijswaterstaat could avail itself of local knowledge about the river
and the dikes.
34 7 officers, 5 sergeants, 34 corporals and 123 ‘‘men” of the light Cavalry were
required to maintain the correspondence. In addition the commanding officers of all
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temporarily responsible for central water management and flood
control, and hence determined policy for the corps of inspectors-
commissars (i.e. what would later become the Rijkswaterstaat).
However, the situation of this corps had changed dramatically with
the restoration of departmental (provincial) powers, in particular
the restoration of the right of departments to superintend the local
dike and water boards and of their right to levy taxes. It was no
longer clear – and the constitution did not alleviate the ambiguity
– what role there was for the different bodies of the central state in
the management of the rivers and especially in the management of
the dikes.
The Rijkswaterstaat, i.e. the corps of commissars-inspectors,
found themselves in a political limbo: on the one hand still charged
with implementing some sort of ‘‘superintendence” of the state’s
waters and flood defenses, but on the other hand now sundered
from direct ‘‘correspondence” with the water boards (and their
dikes) by the intervening powers of the Departmental Govern-
ments. However, the centralist impulse was anything but mori-
bund.28 The Constitution of 1798 had clearly made its mark; the
Rijkswaterstaat had tasted of the contested fruit of national power
and was loath to surrender it again.
In the extremely frigid winter of 1803, with the rivers frozen
over and under the immanent threat of a thaw and consequent
ice jams and flooding, the plan to institute a so-called ‘‘extraordi-
nary” river correspondence again surfaced. This plan had been
floated at the above-mentioned meeting at Vianen in December
1800, and provided for the inspectors-commissars of the Rijkswa-
terstaat to take effective command of dike inspection and corre-
spondence supported by the officers and functionaries of the
local dike-boards and their dike-armies (and also by government
forces garrisoned along the river). It might have been possible, as
J.W. Welcker argues, to have arrived at an understanding on the
extraordinary river correspondence with the Departmental Gov-
ernments, and to ensure the cooperation of local dike boards
through the formers’ (legally sanctioned) intercession.29 However,
the Council for Internal Affairs, hewing to the social contract of
1798, pursued an authoritarian course, requesting authorization
from the Executive Body on January 19th, 1803, to ‘‘implement all
means and resources as the unhoped for emergency may demand,
whether due to the breaking up of ice or high river discharges.”30
The Executive Body acceded and noted that they ‘‘expected” the
Departmental Governments ‘‘to demonstrate all possible coopera-
tion in this matter.”31
On January 21st the Council for Internal Affairs set forth its
instructions for the upcoming ‘‘extraordinary correspondence.”
Once again, Lt. Colonel Krayenhoff was contracted to direct the
operation, which included the sole responsibility for directing mil-
itary operations ‘‘as the overcoming of resistance and the good or-
der of the correspondence shall require.”32 The inspectors-
commissars were enjoined ‘‘in all their actions to conserve as much
as possible the mutual understandings with established powers” in
order to ensure ‘‘a regular and friendly correspondence between
themselves and the various Dike Boards.”33 The instructions in-
cluded the specification of stations for the inspectors-commissars28 Article 68 of the constitution of 1801 granted ‘‘superintendence of all dikes and
waterways” to the Departmental Governments, while Article 69 limited national
‘‘superintendence” to maintaining navigability of rivers and seaways and mediating
between the interests of different Departments.” Welcker, p. 36, Roëll.
29 Welcker, p. 24–25.
30 Welcker, p. 25.
31 Welcker, p. 26.
32 Instructions for River Correspondence, Council of Internal Affairs, 21 January,
1803. Appendix 8 in Welcker, p. 177.
33 Instructions for River Correspondence, Council of Internal Affairs, 21 January,
1803. Appendix 8 in Welcker, p. 178.and their assistants, as well as a list of the cavalrymen required to
maintain the correspondence up and down the branches of the Rhine
and the Meuse.34 Finally, the Departmental Governments were re-
quested to ‘‘operate as communicatively as possible” with the
inspectors-commissars and ‘‘further to maintain such mutual corre-
spondence as the interests of the nation in general, and those of the
inhabitants of each district in particular may require.”35
At the end of January 1803, a threatening thaw set in and by the
first week of February inspectors-commissars had assumed their
pre-ordained positions, the cavalry had been mobilized and other
preparations for the upcoming correspondence were in full swing.
However, on February 6th a new period of frost set in and inasmuch
as frozen rivers were not a threat, the operation was called off.
However, in the meantime the Departmental Governments along
the big rivers had received requests to cooperate with the corre-
spondence and to instruct the dike boards under their superinten-
dence to do likewise. They were up in arms and dispatched letters
to the Executive Bodywhich began by expressing their appreciation
of the present emergency and their pragmatic compliance with the
requests of the Council for Internal Affairs.36 However, they bitterly
condemned as unconstitutional the Council’s efforts to circumvent
the Departmental Governments in trying to establish a ‘‘river corre-
spondence” directly with the dike boards. The dikes belonged to
the dike-boards and now, indirectly, only to the Departments. The
nation-state no longer had any business on the dikes, except at the
behest of the Departments. Adding fuel to this already considerable
fire, the Council for Internal Affairs had passed an even sharper res-
olution on February 2nd, prior to receiving the above-mentioned re-
sponses from the Departmental governments. The Council argued
that, having as yet received no response from the Departmental Gov-
ernments to their circular missive of January 21st, they could not
therefore in the present threatening circumstances be confident of
their cooperative attitude. Hence, they ‘‘authorized and, if necessary,
commanded” Krayenhoff and the inspectors-commissars ‘‘in cases of
procrastination or insufficient cooperation by the respective dike
boards, to give such orders to the dike boards, and themselves under-
take such measures, as the critical circumstances of the Rivers, Dikes,
Sluices, etc. might require.”37
This resolution set bad blood all along the rivers. The depart-
mental governments perceived it as unconstitutional interference
by the central state in their internal affairs. In their view, the only
bodies that could give ‘‘orders” to the dike boards under the consti-
tution of 1801 were the departmental governments. The depart-
ment of Utrecht fulminated that they hardly knew what to think
of the articles regulating supervision of water management both
in the national constitution and in the constitution of the Depart-
ment of Utrecht, when ‘‘another body (the Council for Internal Af-
fairs, CD), unknown to either of these constitutions, is able,
contrary to these articles, to, as it were, insert a kind of authority
in between the power entrusted to the Executive Body in general
and the Departmental Governments in particular.”38 The dike
boards themselves concurred in condemning the show of force bythese regiments were requested to place their troops at the disposition of the
commissars-inspectors and to dispatch them to such locations as the commissars-
inspectors should designate ‘‘as conditions demand.” Welcker.
35 Instructions for River Correspondence, Council of Internal Affairs, 21 January,
1803. Appendix 8 in Welcker.
36 They refused to correspond directly with the Council for Internal Affairs because
in their opinion they were subordinate only to the Executive Body by the terms of the
Constitution of 1801, and were thereby sovereign powers in regard to water policy in
their departments – including of course the superintendence of dike boards. Welcker,
p. 34.
37 Resolution of the Council of Internal Affairs, February 2nd, 1803. Welcker.
38 Letter Department of Utrecht to Executive Body, February 9th, 1803. In Welcker,
p. 39.
Fig. 2. Rhine and Meuse distributaries in the Netherlands.
40 Welcker, p. 54.
41 In fact the plan included not only the proposed floodway from the Southern Lek
Dike through the Neder-Betuwe, but two other floodways as well, one called the
Lijmerswhich would drain water from the Pannerdens Canal into the Geldersche IJssel
and another which would drain excess Lek water through the Geldersche Vallei. All
the proposed floodways had the single purpose of either keeping water out of the
Nederrijn-Lek, or of draining it off to other bodies of water if it got too high. The
proposed floodway through the Neder-Betuwe was the most contentious, because of
the relatively dense population and the prosperity of the farms. The idea of floodways
and river-diversions was by no means new, of course. In their natural state the rivers
had always tended to overflow their banks and to create multiple beddings in times of
flood. Some of these were incorporated into the rivers after they were diked by
creating lower sills along certain stretches of dike which would allow the river to
overflow into the contiguous polders, to rejoin it at a point tens of kilometers further
downstream. Due to floodways and low sills along the Meuse dikes, a good deal of the
province of Noord-Brabant was thus frequently flooded during the winter. It should
be noted that the plan to breach the Southern Lek Dike would have much more
impact than a regulated floodway at the same location. For one thing the breach
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the Department of Utrecht that they considered the extraordinary
correspondence an insult to their competence, and that it was in
any case unnecessary because they were quite capable of carrying
out a correspondence themselves and had done so frequently in
the past without all the consternations and errors of the present mil-
itary correspondence. Their upstream neighbor, the Lek Dike above
the Dam, declared that the present correspondence as organized
by the Council for Internal Affairs utterly conflicted with the ‘‘orga-
nization of the constituent powers as well as with the true interests
of the inhabitants”, and requested that ‘‘the commissars-inspectors
be recalled from the dike as soon as possible in order to prevent
additional confusion and calamities, and . . . be instructed to respect
and obey the orders of the Departmental Government, as well as
those of the dike-boards . . .”39
Welcker suggests that had the thaw that set in at the end of
January continued, matters might yet have been resolved. As it
was, the period of inactivity that ensued, plus the rebellion that
had broken out among the Departments, gave the Council for
Internal Affairs and the Corps of the Rijkswaterstaat an opportu-
nity and cause to develop alternative plans that required author-
ity over a new space on the river, the lands behind the dikes.
Under the still impending threat of a thaw, and effectively
thrown off the dikes by the violent opposition of the Depart-
ments and the dike boards, the Rijkswaterstaat elite forged new
plans to prevent a breach of at least the crucial Northern Lek
Dike. The inspiration was the ‘‘natural” dike breach in the South-
ern Lek Dike at the Spoel, just upstream of Culemborg and the
so-called Dief Dike, that occurred during the flooding in 1795,
see Fig. 2. Many experts, including Jan Blanken and Christiaan
Brunings, were convinced that this breach and the floodwaters
that poured through it into the low-lying Neder-Betuwe polder
saved the Northern Lek Dike and with it the provinces of Holland
and much of Utrecht from severe and rapid inundation. The up-
shot was a new plan to artificially breach the Southern Lek Dike
at the site of the old 1795 breach if during the coming thaw the
Northern Lek Dike seemed at the point of rupture. Of course, it
would also inundate the lands behind the Southern Lek Dike east39 Letter Lekdijk Bovendams to Departmental Government Utrecht, February 3rd,
1803. Quoted in Welcker, p. 43.of the Dief Dike (the Betuwe and Tielerwaard), and cause a great
deal of suffering and damage there. But to the national govern-
ment and its engineers, preserving Holland and Utrecht was
obviously more important.
In terms of the relative areas of inundation, this may have been
justified, but there was a serious constitutional (and moral) ques-
tion here. Could the nation-state sacrifice the lands and goods,
and even threaten the lives, of a part of its population in order to
preserve another part? Such behavior was accepted as an unfortu-
nate prerogative of God or Nature, but hardly of republican govern-
ments. ‘‘Only an unswerving conviction that this was the only
possible escape from inevitable doom and a bizarre sense of its
own power could have moved the Executive Body to make this
decision. That it was unlawful and unconstitutional is beyond all
doubt.”40 It was clear in any case that the state’s new strategy of
extending its sovereignty to the private and public spaces behind
the dikes – having been denied access to the dikes themselves –
was not going to improve relations with either the Departmental
Governments or the dike-boards whose dikes were to be breached
and whose lands were to be flooded.41 The Council for Internal Af-
fairs was well aware of this and decided on February 15th that,would be instantaneous, and immediately inundate the countryside to the full height
of the flooded river. For another thing the lack of a proper floodway with guide levees
would result in indiscriminate flooding of the countryside. In later years, there were
in fact proposals to institutionalize a floodway through the Neder-Betuwe which
would have caused a lot less damage.
Fig. 3. Floodplains along the Lek River showing obstructions in the form of dikes, hedgerows and trees. Melchior Bolstra 1764. (Melchior Bolstra, 1751 and 1764. Kaart van de
rivier de Lek met zijn uiterwaarden Noorder en Zuider dijken van de Merwede beneden Krimpen tot het schoor van Hagestein boven Vianen. Detail below Vianen. (Map
collection hoogheemraadschap van Rijnland nr 59, blad 7)).
43 These instructions stipulated that the troops should be ‘‘well armed” and
‘‘supplied with sufficient live ammunition”, and that they should be prepared to ‘‘turn
violence with violence” in order to protect the dike workers in the execution of their
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preparations secret.42 In order to ensure the success of the plans
even in the event of violent resistance, two companies of infantry
were to be posted at Gorinchem.
The plot was hatched none too soon, because on February 13th
it had begun to thaw again, and the breaking up of ice on the river
threatened disaster. The commissars-inspector, including Jan Blan-
ken who had masterminded the plan and was to lead the operation
on the southern shore, returned to their posts on the rivers. Blan-
ken studied the situation on the Southern Lek Dike, arranged for
both open and sealed instructions for two trustworthy dike-mas-
ters and for secret signals that would announce the operation’s
inception from the northern shore Lek town of Vreeswijk. He
also prepared orders for the infantry troops stationed in Gorin-42 However, the original decision of the 14th included a provision to inform the
Departmental Governments of the impending plans, and to invite them to send
delegates to The Hague to discuss objections. The affected departmental governments
hastened to do so, and protested in no uncertain terms. Although the Departments
were thus aware of the general tenor of the plans, they did not know how or when
they were to be carried out, because of the secrecy surrounding the preparations.chem.43 The dike masters were charged by the open instructions
to wait for the secret signal from Vreeswijk and only then to open
their secret instructions.44 These charged them to take 300 men
from the ‘‘dike armies” of the southern-shore polders of Alblasserw-
aard and the Vijfheerenlanden (which were in the Department of
Holland and would not be affected by the breach because they were
behind the Dief Dike) and proceed to cut the Lek Dike at the ap-
pointed location. From a pre-1795 perspective, this would have
looked very much like an invasion by foreign troops.45tasks. Instructions Jan Blanken to the Commanding Officer of the Garrison at
Gorinchem, February, 1803. Welcker, p. 66.
44 The dike masters, in other words, were unaware of the nature of their task until
its prosecution was immanent.
45 The dike that was to be breached and the lands that were to be flooded were in
the Department of Gelderland. Holland started just downstream on the other side of
the Diefdijk and Utrecht occupied the opposite (north) shore.
47 If the owner complied, then the newly formed land could be claimed by the
128 C. Disco / Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 34 (2009) 119–131In the event, forceful protests in The Hague from the Depart-
mental Governments, especially that of Gelderland whose lands
were being threatened by inundation, as well as studied reluctance
by Krayenhoff and Brunings, stationed on the northern shore and
charged with giving the secret signal for cutting the southern dike,
to actually do so, even when the river had risen to the very top of
the northern dike, made all these preparations futile. Of interest is
the prophetic wording of objections to the plan by delegates of the
Department of Gelderland. With considerable ardor they con-
demned the ‘‘measures to be taken as contrary to the spirit of
the Constitution and the Departmental Regulations, irreconcilable
with a Republican polity and only tolerable in a monarchical and
despotic state.”46
That monarchical and somewhat despotic state would come
soon enough, but for the moment the crisis of 1803 had passed
as the ice was carried away and river levels returned to normal.
But the entire affair had discredited the administration of the rivers
and especially the management of floods by the Council for Inter-
nal Affairs. By October, responsibility for the national Waterstaat
had devolved on a new Commission of Superintendence for the
Rivers, which had been mandated by the Constitution of 1801
but never implemented. The rights and duties of this commission
and its relationships to the Departmental Governments and the
dike boards were spelled out in its charter. They reinforced the
political mapping of spaces and times on the rivers as set out in
the 1801 constitution, and made short shrift of the ambiguities
that had caused tempers to rise in 1803. While in principle en-
abling the nation-state to deal with the rivers, especially in times
of danger, as a kind of national commons, they also contained
express guarantees of autonomy for the Departments and the dike
boards over their internal affairs. This new arrangement made it
possible for the Executive Body to promulgate two new laws, both
of which survived through the remaining political changes of the
‘‘French Period” and its demise, and both of which ultimately be-
came keystones of river policy under the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.
The first was a law regulating ‘‘extraordinary river correspon-
dence,” passed January 10, 1806. These regulations contained de-
tailed instructions for the routing of messages between
watchposts, but were tellingly silent on the division of authority
among the inspectors of the Rijkswaterstaat, the Departmental gov-
ernments, and the officers of the dike boards. It stands to reason
that the Rijkswaterstaat, with its cosmopolitan expertise and
monopoly on information was the tacit master of the situation,
but it was apparently left to the diplomacy of the Inspectors and
their staff to implement this mastery in practice. Nonetheless, a le-
gal framework for an ‘‘extraordinary river correspondence” had
been laid down which in times of danger encapsulated the tradi-
tional local ‘‘dike watches” and the supervision thereof by the
Departments within a national panoptical regime of surveillance.
In subsequent years, this law and the practices it defined would
be further refined.
The second law extended the influence of the nation-state to
the riverbed itself and the floodplains. This would ultimately prove
at least as fruitful as the establishment of multi-level ‘‘correspon-
dence” in times of danger. The law in question, passed by the Exec-
utive Body on February 24th, 1806, was the ‘‘General River and
Water Law over the Rivers and Streams of this Republic.” The
law represented an effort to improve the quality of the winterbeds
(floodplains) of the rivers as conduits for water and ice. Its aim was
thus to prevent or at least reduce high river stages and the forma-
tion of ice dams, rather than to deal with their consequences, as46 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Internal Affairs with representatives of
the Departments, February 22, 1803. Appendix 54 of Welcker.was the case with plans for river correspondence and artificial
diversions. The law set limits to the rights of riparian landholders
to reclaim land from the riverbed. Hence, excepting explicit per-
mission from the Commission of Superintence, it prohibited the
construction of new dams or other works, and the lengthening or
heightening of existing works, in order to speed up sedimentation
of new land. It also prohibited salmon nets or other works that
would interfere with the river’s even flow. These prohibitions ap-
plied both to private individuals and to corporate bodies (like the
dike-boards and Departmental Governments). In like fashion,
‘‘emerging” land could not be built up and privately claimed if this
‘‘compromised the general interests of the country.” As far as the
floodplains were concerned, the law stipulated that all buildings
and works deemed disadvantageous to rivers and streams were
to be removed, and that it was henceforth unlawful to build or
heighten summer dikes without express permission from the Com-
mission. Also, trees could not be planted on currently unplanted
portions of the floodplains. Furthermore, owners of riparian lands
could be compelled by the state to construct such works (e.g. groy-
nes and wing-dams) as the state deemed necessary in order to im-
prove the river.47 Article 10, finally, represented a diplomatic effort
by the national government to achieve a measure of standardized
control over the quality and construction of the dikes themselves.
It outlined a procedure whereby the Commission of Superinten-
dence, judging that a particular dike needed ‘‘heightening, strength-
ening or improvement” or that particular summer dikes or dams
under the care of a dike-board be removed, could approach the
Departmental Government responsible for the ‘‘superintendence”
of the dike-board in question to ‘‘order” that dike-board to comply
with the wishes of the Commission. Clearly this was a roundabout
solution which respected the Departmental Governments’ constitu-
tional autonomy in these matters – a far cry from previous efforts
at instituting river correspondence, let alone occasional plots to
breach dikes. Nonetheless - at least with the wisdom of hindsight
– this article, and indeed the law as a whole, turned out to be a major
step toward a practical conception of the rivers as a unified drainage
system, indeed of viewing them as national commons, the use and
abuse of which had to be regulated by the state as defender of the
collective good and bulwark against chronic tragedy.
3.3. The Bonapartist State: 1806–1814
On June 5th, 1806, the Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte crowned
his brother, Louis Napoleon, King of the Netherlands. The adminis-
tration of theWaterstaatwas once again reshuffled in order to fit it
into the new autocratic political structure. King Louis Bonaparte,
like the Patriots before him, had the good sense to respect existing
local arrangements for drainage and the maintenance and defense
of the dikes, but clearly the advocates of a more centralist and
authoritarian approach to spaces and times on the rivers had little
reason to be dissatisfied with his accession to the throne. While the
king’s first Dutch winters had been mild and uneventful, at the end
of December 1808, it began freezing hard during a period of high
water, and the rivers froze from shore to shore. In this time of trep-
idation, the words of the Departmental Deputy of Gelderland about
the ruthlessness of ‘‘monarchical” and ‘‘despotic” states proved
prophetic. It was the King’s considered opinion, and therefore pol-
icy, that if it were possible to save the Northern Lek Dike by sabo-
taging the Southern one, it should be done. The King himselfowner. If the owner refused and the state built the necessary works, new land would
fall to the state. This created a possibility for the state to expand its territorial hold on
the rivers at the expense of private citizens. This, however, could in no way impair the
duties of the responsible dike boards to maintain their dikes and to protect them with
river works at their own costs according to their own laws and regulations.
50 It was the textual inspiration for a new Regulation for River Correspondence,
enacted in January 1812 and revised under rather different political circumstances in
1835. Mazel, p. 70.
51 The turn of phrase is by the first executive board of the Dutch Royal Institute of
Engineers, in their foreword to the Institute’s first volume of Transactions, 1848, First
Part.
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a more extensive and costly tract of land from flooding.” Clearly, an
absolute monarch, being in a sense uncontested ‘‘owner” of all the
riverine and riparian spaces, could make decisions that republicans
could not. In any case, Blanken was ordered to take exactly the
same measures (including his secret instructions) as he had in
1803 and, in the end, with the same outcome. Unluckily for Hol-
land’s peace of mind, a dike along the northern shore of the Waal
breached and flooded the Betuwe so that it could no longer receive
the waters of the Lek, even were the southern Lek Dike to be
pierced. As it turned out the Northern Lek Dike withstood the on-
slaught – carefully tended under the regime of the ‘‘extraordinary
river correspondence.”
The ‘‘failure” of the emergency derivation through the Southern
Lek Dike in January 1809 by no means marked the end of this
rather draconic project. Only a year later, on January 25th, 1810,
Blanken submitted aMémoire to the King outlining improved plans
for carrying it out. One of the weak spots, in Blanken’s opinion, was
entrusting the decision to breach or not to breach to one or two
individuals, whom he felt could not bear the responsibility, and
hence would tarry needlessly and perhaps fatally in ordering the
signal to be given. He therefore proposed a committee composed
of the Minister of Waterstaat or a direct representative, the inspec-
tor at Vreeswijk, the President and one or two officers of the dike-
board of the Northern Lek Dike above the dam, and finally one or
two of the oldest and most experienced of the dike-masters from
the same dike board. The decision was to be taken by majority vote
and to be ‘‘final.” This was of course a preposterous proposal,
which would place the fate of the Southern Lek Dike during times
of flood in the hands of those who would most directly profit by its
destruction – and by the ruin of their neighbors to the south.48
In July 1810, the emperor Napoleon Bonaparte recalled King
Louis and simply absorbed the Netherlands into his empire, which
by then also included the entire German Rhineland. The Rijkswater-
staat became a subdivision of the French Service des Ponts et Chau-
ssées. While this compelled all the inspectors and engineers to
write in French, it certainly did not dampen their ardor for increas-
ing the national grasp on riverine spaces nor diminish the possibil-
ities for doing so. Blanken’s Mémoire, wherein he finally gave free
rein to the panoptical and authoritarian ambitions that had moti-
vated him and his colleagues during the crisis of 1803 and again
during the flood of January 1809, is a case in point. Blanken, who
had remained inspector general of the Rijkswaterstaat, used the
Memoire to fill in the gaps in the general instructions of 1806
and 1808, and also to define the responsibilities of the various par-
ties. State engineers were beholden to follow without hesitation
the orders of the inspector-general, and had to submit daily reports
as well as a final report at the termination of the correspondence.
The dike boards too had to submit reports to the inspector-general.
In addition, if any of the state engineers requested the performance
of some urgent task, by well-motivated letter, the ‘‘dike boards had
to acquiesce with alacrity and with all the credit, funds and care
over which they disposed, and eschewing efforts to delay the exe-
cution of these tasks by expressing doubts or requesting convoca-
tions.”49 Blanken clearly was a man of great practical experience in
dealing with recalcitrant dike boards. He concluded the final section48 Welcker, though his animosity toward Blanken is sometimes excessive, is right in
condemning this proposal as ‘‘dishonoring Blanken, who made it possible for good
men to be seduced into committing evil deeds, against their wishes and as it were
unknownst to themselves. It was a reckless gamble to so severely try human
steadfastness. . .” Welcker, 139. In the event Blanken’s committee was never
instituted, nor indeed was the Southern Lek Dike ever sabotaged. However, the
notion of a derivation through the Betuwe – as well as in many other places –
continued to be considered a palliative for threatened dikes until well into the 20th
century.
49 Mazel, p. 67.of his Mèmoire with a note on his pet subject. He recommended that
200 infantry troops be posted at Gorinchem in order to deal with
violent resistance by local inhabitants against efforts to artificially
breach the dikes. Blanken’s Mèmoire proved to be the basis for the
definitive structure of the ‘‘river correspondence,” as it crystallized
out in the course of the 19th century.50 It defined both the normal
correspondence maintained by the dike boards and ‘‘extraordinary”
correspondence maintained by the state. During times of danger, this
‘‘extraordinary” correspondence effectively entangled the entire riv-
er system and its local defenders within a single web of information
and control managed by the corps of the Rijkswaterstaat.
4. Conclusion
The chequered history of the integration of a national level of
water management and flood control into the robust provincial
and local arrangements prevailing in the Netherlands obviously
did not stop in 1812 or 1814. With the fall of Napoleon and the
establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, a new
political situation arose: on the one hand restoration of the prov-
inces in something like their former glory, but on the other hand
the (re-) emergence of a strongly centralized, indeed autocratic na-
tion-state. In this polarized force-field, a national level of river
management continued to develop, over the systematic opposition
of the provinces and the ressentiment of the water boards to be
sure, but nonetheless vigorously pursued by a small coterie of
engineers and surveyors who harbored the ‘‘modernist” conviction
that centralization, rationalization and superior knowledge offered
the best hope of managing floods on the rivers.
As had been the case during the Dutch Republic, the Batavian
Republic and the ‘‘French Period,” the local water and dike boards
stood at the epicenter of Dutch water management. Armed with
their own charters, laws, and budgets they were responsible in
the first place for building and maintaining works to ‘‘turn the
water, or show it the way out.”51 The provinces ‘‘superintended”
the work of the water and dike boards while the Rijkswaterstaat
‘‘superintended” works of national importance and in particular
the rivers according to the Law of February 24th, 1806, and the reg-
ulations for ‘‘extraordinary river correspondence.” The question was
what the state would do with these prerogatives, especially in view
of the annual threat of flooding from ice-choked rivers in flood.
During the French period two types of ‘‘national” approaches
had crystallized out. Both were based on a privileged panoptical
view of the rivers, such as neither the provinces nor the dike
boards were capable of achieving. To be sure, this was seriously
hampered by the lack of a good and detailed survey of the rivers,
but this would be made good by the Rijkswaterstaat in the 1820s
and 30s.52 Nonetheless, the Rijkswaterstaat’s perspective was inher-
ently panoptical and national, and it was hence the only actor capa-52 Indeed, the lack of up-to-date detailed maps made the River Law of 1806 as well
as a Dike Law passed in 1810, almost dead letters. The Dike Law had created ‘‘Dike
Rings” by merging polders protected by a ring of major primary dikes. The idea was to
replace maintenance duties for the dikes in natura by taxes, and so to make it possible
to include those living at great distances from primary dikes, but nonetheless
protected by them, to contribute to their upkeep. This arrangement was long-resisted,
despite its manifest justice, and has only been effectuated in recent years. For the
history of hydraulic measurement and map-making in the Netherlands, see H.C.
Toussaint, ‘‘Uitgetekend en uitgemeten. De Algemene Dienst van Rijkswaterstaat,”
Tijdschrift voor Waterstaatsgeschiedenis 7, no. 2 (1998), Toussaint, Uitgemeten en
uitgetekend: de geschiedenis van de Algemene Dienst van de Rijkswaterstaat’s-
Gravenhage, 1998.
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called ‘‘the good of the nation.” What were the two strategies it
pursued?
4.1. Flood control
The first strategy, about which much has been said above, was
based on preventing actual dike-breaches during times of high
water. It had two variants. The first entailed ensuring that the dikes
were well scrutinized, that everyone and everything was prepared
to intervene when dike-failure threatened, and that information
about the state of the flood along the entire river be accumulated
at a central decision-making point. The second entailed making
or activating floodways and derivations to draw water off the riv-
ers and onto the surrounding countryside, thus relieving pressure
on the dikes and preventing accidental and unpredictable cata-
strophic dike breaches. The Beerse Floodway along the Meuse
had functioned like this for centuries. Although at various times
plans were made for many more floodways, in practice few were
realized, and then chiefly along the Meuse. The floodways had all
been abandoned by the time the Beerse Floodway was closed in
1942.
This ‘‘flood management” approach was based on the nation-
state’s authoritative mastery over extraordinary times on the riv-
er.53 During these extraordinary times the national Rijkswaterstaat
was allowed far greater prerogatives on and around the dikes than
during normal times. The provinces looked the other way while
the state engineers exercised authority over the dike boards and
their ‘‘dike-armies.” Due to their system of horse-borne (and of
course later telegraphic) correspondence, the state engineers were
apprised of conditions at all points on the river, and could hence
make more ‘‘intelligent” decisions – at least from a ‘‘cosmopolitan”
perspective – in any given local situation than could the local dike
boards themselves.54 Whether they appreciated this ‘‘higher wis-
dom” or not, the dike boards were beholden to go along with the tac-
tical decisions that it inspired. On the other hand, no one knew the
dikes like those who built and maintained them with their own
hands, and the local knowledge of inhabitants and dike-masters of-
ten proved of great value to the state engineers as they labored to
keep the river within the dikes and to apply scarce resources where
they were most needed.
The other strategy of ‘‘flood management” we have considered
is that of derivations and floodways. These could be designed
beforehand: for example, by constructing a short section of dike
at a lower threshold so that the river would overflow at predictable
locations and along defined floodways rather than break through at
some random weak spot in the dikes and wreak sudden havoc on
the countryside behind. Such sites could also be fitted with special
sluices, which made this type of ‘‘flood management” more flexi-
ble. The crudest variant of this strategy is of course the one we
have discussed: that of cutting artificial dike breaches at the mo-
ment supreme in order to reduce pressure on neighboring dikes,
e.g. the plans for sabotaging the Southern Lek Dike. In both cases,
the interest of the inhabitants in keeping their dike whole and their53 Flood-management as practiced by Rijkswaterstaat increased pressure to develop
new forms of (panoptical) knowledge like detailed maps and insight into the
formation of ice dams, the extent and duration of floods, river depths, etc. In order to
carry out the necessary programs of measurement and map-making, a seperate
‘‘General Service” (Algemene Dienst) was added to the Rijkswaterstaat in 1809. For
flood control and the General Service, see Toussaint, Uitgemeten en uitgetekend: de
geschiedenis van de Algemene Dienst van de Rijkswaterstaat. and Bosch, Om de macht
over het water. De nationale waterstaatsdienst tussen staat en samenleving 1798–1849,
pp. 87–88.
54 i.e. ‘‘intelligent” from the Godlike perspective of the least harm for the greatest
number. This was not always the same as ‘‘intelligent” from the perspective of local
interests.lands dry was sacrificed to ‘‘higher” or at least ‘‘other” interests: i.e.
other dikes, lands, provinces. Here too extraordinary prerogatives
to pierce dikes were granted to the Rijkswaterstaat as the agent
of a purported ‘‘national” interest. Although, during the Batavian
and ‘‘French” period, designs on the Southern Lek Dike were re-
garded even by the designated perpetrators as more or less illicit
operations to be carried out in the greatest secrecy, the very same
floodway, albeit in a more manageable and better contained form,
and provided with artificial hills to which the population and their
cattle could flee, was still being openly recommended as sound
policy by a State Commission in 1821.
The time of ice and flood, the ‘‘full river,” can be seen, as I noted
earlier, as a kind of temporary commons. It is a commons of shared
risk, rather than the classic commons of shared resources, but the
dynamics and the potential for tragedy are similar. Prior to 1798,
times of ‘‘full river” threw all the dike boards back on their own lim-
ited resources and their partial knowledge of the situation. This
willy-nilly involved them in a strategic game of blind and collective
‘‘processing” of excess river water. Local responses to the full river
were framed in relative ignorance of what was happening else-
where on the river and, particularly, in ignorance of what was
approaching fromupriver. The ‘‘full river” pitted eachdike, eachpol-
der and each province against its counterpart. Every dike breach
somewhere else was a boon that lessened the chance of local dike
failure. Ice dams that could be broken up could happily become
someone else’s problem if they consolidated again far enough
downstream. Every upstream floodway that went into action drew
water off, and was seen as improving local chances of surviving the
‘‘full river.” The most brutal feature of this unregulated ‘‘risk com-
mons” was that it provided everyone with an incentive not only to
make their own flood defenses as invincible as possible, but also
to weaken those of others – up to and including the cutting of dikes
by stealth and deceit. As long as the dikes themselves were inviola-
ble commons owned and managed by dike boards representing the
collective will of the landowners of riparian polders, nothing could
alter this situation. Though the dike boards themselves prevented
tragic outcomes at a local level, e.g. by combatting ‘‘free riding” in
the construction and maintenance of the local dikes, they them-
selves had no other choice than to be selfish and amoral actors in
the tragedy-bound ‘‘risk commons” of the ‘‘full river.”
From the panoptical view of the nation-state, the self-centered
strategies of the individual dike boards and their supervisory prov-
inces were the ingredients for at best suboptimal outcomes and at
worst a full-fledged tragedy of the commons. However, whether
the nation-state could improve matters by temporarily taking over
the dikes and redefining the ‘‘full river” as a temporarily national-
ized ‘‘risk commons” depended on what aims it pursued and what
disciplines it imposed. Its cosmopolitan interests of course differed
from those of many of the local riparian populations, and its poli-
ticians and bureaucrats could well favor particular regions or social
classes over others.
The ‘‘extraordinary river correspondence” whereby authority
over dike-watches all along the rivers was effectively ceded to
the state – though of course only temporarily and according to
strict protocol – was a measure which apparently improved every-
one’s chances to survive the ‘‘full river.” The superior expertise of
the state engineers, their panoptical system of correspondence
which provided them with real-time data on the progress of the
flood and ice jams, and their ability to concentrate superior forces
at threatened locations made it profitable for dike boards to coop-
erate and transform the ‘‘correspondence” into a cornerstone of na-
tional river policy. The ‘‘correspondence” also prevented the ‘‘risk
commons” from degenerating into a destructive free-for-all, by
reducing the threat that dike-boards or groups of landowners
might take matters into their own hands and sabotage some neigh-
boring dike to save their own.
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to the temporary toehold on the dikes granted them by virtue
of the ‘‘correspondence,” as, for example, the covert 1803 and
1809 plans for sabotaging the Southern Lek Dike seem to show.
In point of fact, by including the sabotaging of dikes in its flood
control policies, the state was effectively claiming temporary
hegemony over another space on the river: the private and pub-
lic lands behind the dikes, a claim which appeared to be quite
unconstitutional. The more fundamental question here was
whether the ‘‘national interest” also included the interest of the
Betuwe farmers whose homes and farms would be washed away
in order to save prosperous, urbanized and extensive Holland. It
was of course argued that this was a smaller sacrifice for a great-
er good, but this would at the very least require absolute cer-
tainty about the efficacy of the measure – something about
which there really was no consensus.
The same goes for the entire strategy of deviations and flood-
ways. Quite aside from the question of the rights of those whose
lands and farms would be deluged, the efficacy of deviations for
lowering water levels was seriously debated throughout the 19th
century. In fact it was argued that in the long run deviations would
ruin the river’s ability to discharge water and ice because they
would reduce currents, increase shoaling and degrade the river
channel both for shipping and for drainage.
4.2. River management
This brings us squarely to the second basic approach, about
which little has been said above, but which was certainly implicit
in the River Law of 1806. It depended on achieving hegemony over
the entire riverbed between the mainline winter dikes and prohib-
iting private or public proprietors from undertaking construction
or other activities that would compromise the river’s ability to dis-
charge water. This hegemony over the entire winterbed also ulti-
mately provided the legitimation for state reconstruction of the
rivers aimed at creating self-sustaining shipping channels and atproviding adequate discharge capacity: the large river normaliza-
tion projects that were carried out after 1850.
As early as 1804, Christiaan Brunings, though no enemy of devi-
ations, had also made an appeal for the improvement of the river-
beds.55 As an exponent of the small coterie of ‘‘enlightened” 18th
century philosophers and scientists who had advocated rational
and centralized management of the rivers, he argued that all rivers
with a light gradient will deterioriate of their own accord unless
one fights this evil ‘‘by ceaseless, unified measures tending toward
a single end.” This appeal in a report to the Commission of Superin-
tendence was the beginning of a long and verbose debate on possible
remedies for the sorry state of the rivers, carried on in numerous
pamphlets as well as in the reports of several full-fledged ‘‘River
Commissions.” But in the short term it also facilitated the General
River Law of 1806, which provided the state with legal instruments
to prevent further abuse of the rivers’ hydraulic capacity by riparian
property holders. While the state’s hegemony over the river’s ‘‘sum-
mer bed” itself had never been in question, its hegemony over the
distinct space of the flood plains and over lands reclaimed from
the riverbed certainly was. The Law of 1806 essentially redefined
the floodplains as part of the riverbed and hence as state-managed
public property, rather than as private property at the disposition
of landholders. Thenceforth, private property in the floodplains
was subject to state-enforced regulations protecting the general
interest in the rivers’ ability to drain off water and ice.
The well-known large projects undertaken after 1850 to untan-
gle the rivers, normalize them, and provide them with newmouths
on the principle that each river should be able to discharge its own
burden of water and ice at all times were direct descendants of
Brunings’ plea and the 1806 law. Though the river improvements
ultimately reduced the frequency and height of threatening high
waters, they never eliminated the need for extra vigilance duiring
times of danger. And they would have been unimaginable in the
first place had the state not been able to employ times of danger
to legitimize the imposition of central state coordination and
authority on fragmented local regimes for flood control.55 Christiaan Brunings, Consideratieën nopens de algemeene verbetering der Hoofdri-
vieren (n.p.: 1804).
